The date was August 28, 2012. The stars weren't quite twinkling.
A pious Muslim lady posing as a pilgrim paid a visit to the home of Sufi cleric Said Atsayev. Upon arrival, she had little to say. Wearing an explosive belt loaded with nails and ball bearings, the lady spoke the language of suicide bombs, killing herself, Atsayev, and six others, including an 11-year-old boy visiting with his parents. There are no famous last words.
The making of a Dagistani "black widow": How Alla Saprykina became Aminat Kurbanova
Over the past ten years, suicide missions by widows of Salafi extremists, dubbed "Black Widows", has become a habit of extremist groups from Chechnya and nearby regions. This story of this particular black widow merits a closer look, if only to acknowledge certain patterns and trends in radicalization.
Alla Saprykina (later Aminat Kurbanova), an ethnic Russian female who was both wife and widow of Islamist militants, earned herself a harem in heaven by killing the 74-year-old Atsayev, a prominent Sufi sheikh in the troubled province of Russian Dagestan. How does a feisty, attractive young Russian girl brought up as an Eastern Orthodox Christian become a suicide bomber? The recipe, unfortunately, is not an unfamiliar one- fall in love, embrace ideology, and pepper your own version of Romeo and Juliet with some religious extremism.
Aminat was known as a talented actress and promising dancer during this period of her life.
While studying at a theatre school in Dagestan, Aminat fell inlove with fellow actor Marat Kurbanov. The couple married in 2003 and she gave birth to a daughter, Malika, two years later. When their daughter was one year old, Aminat and Marat were introduced to Islam by Marat’s brother Rustam.
One year later, Marat converted to Islam with Aminat by his side. But they didn't become members of the Sufi school indigenous to Dagestan. Instead, the Kurbanovs embraced an import model of Islam- one based in the Salafi school which forced them to reconfigure their lives and be born again. The couple left the theatre because dancing and acting are considered un-Islamic in this school of Islam.
A source close to Aminat described the change in her attitude and demeanor:
“When we met up, she would tell me that women should be closed off [from society]. I think this was all due to [her husband] – she was wildly in love with him. It wasn’t her initiative, at first. She slowly turned herself over to [radical Islam].”
In 2008, Rustam Kurbanov was killed in a police house raid on suspected militants. The young couple were allegedly shocked. Angry and desiring revenge, Marat left his family, allegedly joined militants to avenge his brother's death, and never returned. In 2009, Marat died in a counterterrorism operation conducted by Russian forces. The source said that, after Marat's death, it was as if something was "ticking inside" of Aminat, as if she was "biding her time".
Marat's older brother, Ali, lived in Moscow. On a supposed "holiday" in Dagestan, Ali disappeared. It was alleged that Ali had been killed by Russian police. Aminat was left with Malika- and a twisted story of marriage in which her husband and two brothers had been killed by police on three separate occasions over the course of a few years.
Aminat started to earn money as an Islamic dress seamstress and became involved with local Salafist extremists. She began to be watched by security services, who allegedly searched her flat and questioned her after the death of her husband. Given that Aminat allegedly went through four husbands, it is unclear at which point the Russian authorities began to suspect Aminat. All four of her husbands are loosely described as "NVF fighters".
Hungry for love, revolution, or the firmness of ideology, Aminat married the best man at her wedding, Timur Kurbamagomedov, whom she also met while studying theatre. Timur went to prison for arson when he burned down a store that sold alcohol. Law enforcement described Timur as an NVF "accomplice", who refused to return to the NVF fold after becoming involved in a rehabilitation program resulting in a suspended sentence. (Note: Timur probably changed his name or became an intelligence asset following his release from prison because I can find neither hide nor hare of him online.) Annoyed by Timur's reluctance to wage jihad, Aminat left Timur and dove deeper into Salafi fanaticism.
Where Salafi law stands on divorce did not concern Aminat. She quickly married Magomed Ilyasov, a fighter with the Gubdenskiy "band group". Magomed helped train the Russian Salafists Mariya Khorosheva and Vitaliy Razdobudko, a married couple who blew themselves up in two separate terror attacks in the village of Gubden in 2011. Aminat put on her mourning clothes again when Magomed died on 19 December 2011 while transporting a homemade bomb in his own vehicle.
Reports suggest that Aminat had made a previous attempt at a suicide bombing in Moscow only to discover that she was being followed by police. As a result, Aminat went under the radar for a year only to re-emerge under suspicion of recruiting locals for the NVF. She married a member of the NVF group led by Gusein Mamayev.
In May of 2012, Aminat's fourth husband was killed by Russian police in a counter-terrorism operation. Law enforcment officials openly sought information about Aminat. The police believed she was responsible for the recruitment of Rizvan Aliyev and Mulimata Aliyeva, a brother-sister team who blew themselves up at a police post on 3 May 2012, killing 16 people. The NVF group associated with Aminat's husband trained the Aliyevas for their suicide mission. At this point, Aminat reportedly began to prepare herself for the role of suicide bomber.
On the morning of the bombing, Aminat kissed her daughter, Malika, goodbye and took a bus to the cleric's house. How Aminat gained entrance into Atsayev's home remains murky. On the day of the bombing, some reports suggest Aminat convinced the gate keepers to let her in to see Sheikh Atsayev because she was Russian and wanted to convert to Islam. According to various Russian press reports, Atsayev invited her into his home along with a translator, since he only spoke Avar. Other reporting says that she told guards that she was pregnant and that she should be let in right away.
Her relatives tried to keep the news from Malika, but the Sunday Times reported that she overheard at school that ‘your mum’s a suicide bomber’ and saw her mother's severed head on TV. During their investigation of the bombing, Russian police established that the Aliyevas "were not fully responsible for the May attack on on the police station. Police also found a tumbler switch among the remnants of the bombing device. This suggests that Aminat probably detonated the bomb herself.
At the time of her death, Aminat was wanted by local police for her involvement in the NVF-sponsored terrorist attacks the police patrol in Makhachkala. Her daughter, Malika, is 7 years old. What she knows of the world is subject to question.
Said Atsayev: The threat he poses to militant Islamists
Atsayev- also known as Sheikh Said Afandi- spoke out against violent Islam. As a representative of traditional Sufi Islam, Atsayev advocated reconciliation between the new breed of extremist Salafism brought to Dagestan by the Afghani conflict. His murder occurred just as President Putin was touring the region, making pleas for national unity.
Sheikh Atsayev/Afandi was not born into his faith. At the tender age of seven, Atsayev's father passed away. He dropped out of high school to become a shepherd and help support his widowed mother and family. Afandi served in the Soviet Army and worked as a firefighter before his conversion to Sufism at the age of 32. He survived a previous assasination attempt by Salafists in November 2007.
By the time of his death, Afandi had published many books, and was known for his love and composition of poetry. (Unfortunately, even his poems would be held against him by dogmatic Salafists, who scorned his use of the local language rather than Arabic.) Garnering a large number of murids ("committed ones") meant that Afandi's influence was palpable. He provided ethical leadership and inspiration to the 80% of Dagestanis who describe themselves as Sufis. Since most Dagestani police and political officials followed Afandi, his efforts to establish peace among local Salafis and Sufis carried more than just metaphysical weight.
His murder follows "similar religiously-motivated killings" in Dagestan and other parts of the former USSR, targeting Muslim leaders who are hostile to the radical forms of Islam trickling in from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Salafis advocate an independent state, or emirate, that would include Caucasus and parts of southern Russia that contain a significant Muslim population.
Sufi v. Salafi
Sufi brotherhoods differ from Salafi Muslims in their closer affiliation with Shiite Islam, rooted in a more mystical, awe-inspired approach to faith. For example, Sufis (and some Shiites) pray over the tombs of revered saints and encourage aristic representations of spiritual matters while Salafis condemn such acts as a form of idolatry. Like the Eastern Orthodox and the Catholics, Sufis and most Shiite Muslims do not see a conflict between images of saints or prophets. Like American Protestants and Christian extremists, Sunni Muslims, including Salafis, find it impossible to image an image of something sacred that does not provoke worship and idolatry.
The tension is not a political one which can be erased- it is a spiritual and emotional tension woven deep in the fabric of their worldviews. It is rooted in a very modern obsession with the literalism of the sacred texts (whether Bible or Koran)- an obsession that makes language the only appropriate vehicle for spiritual enlightment.
Peace, as promulgated by the Astayev and other traditional Sufis, would put a dint in the violence preferred by a variety of groups, from Salafis to the Christian neoconservative advocates of permanent war against "terrorism". Local scholars consider these bombings as attempts to sidetrack peacekeeping efforts and to escalate the cycle of violence in the region.
After tens of thousands thronged the streets to pay their respects to Atsayev, Dagestan's secular authorities declared an official day of mourning. If the killing goes unpunished, the authority of Atsayev's influential followers will be questioned, said Alexei Malashenko of the Carnegie Moscow Center. "If the main figure is killed and his followers are silent, this will lead to a major reappraisal of values" in Dagestan, he said.
The traditional Astrakhan fur hat is made from Persian lambs wool. Nikolai Gogol who is believed to had worn it in the style of Astayev, lacking the extra brim or side flaps. Dubbed "the pie hat" in Soviet times, Leonid Brezhnev was known to wear it frequently. Winston Churchill probably built some negative associations into this traditional hat when he elected to wear one at the Yalta Conference in 1945.
The Chechnyan context
Salafi insurgents in Dagestan are part of a broader Islamist insurgency across the North Caucasus following two post-Soviet wars pitting the Kremlin against separatists in neighboring Chechnya. After the First Chechnya War from 1994-1996, Shamil Basayev and Saudi-born Ibn Al-Khattab launched a terrorist campaign against the Russian-backed Chechnyan regime by declaring their intention to unite Chechnya and Dagestan under Islamic rule and expel Russia from the Caucasus. In 1999, Putin gained popularity with Russians by launching a second war against Chechen separatists, some of which were not religiously-motivated. This enabled him to suceed Yeltsin as President of Russia.
Ibn Al-Khattab (and his successor, Abu Walid al-Ghamdi) enlisted the techniques and ideology learned from bin Laden. Issuing a worldwide call for jihad, they built a local network of Al Qaeda members who fled Afghanistan after the 2001 invasion by US forces. Hundreds of young, unemployed jihadis flocked to Chechnya to help liberate Dagestan. Terrorist training camps were set up in the unmarked border areas between Chechnya and Dagestan. Reprisals and counter-reprisals swept Dagestan and its neighbors into a perfect storm of terrorism that wreaked havoc on civilian life and made normalcy appear like a poppy-generated pipe dream.
Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov, an advisor to the Chairman of the Russian Council of Muftis, said that the ultimate number of mourners streaming into Chirkei after Astayev's death may have been as large as 300,000 people. He believes that "one of the main reasons why Dagestan did not descend into outright war alongside Chechnya in the mid- and late- 1990s had to do with the teachings and influence of [Astayev] and those like him". When a Muslim doesn't advocate for violence and murder, a Salafist extremist quickly calls him a heretic and begins to plan for a way to remove his influence. Death usually does the trick.
On the other hand, human rights workers claim that Salafis in Dagestan are subject to police abductions, torture in secret prisons and extrajudicial executions. Every story about another human rights abuse generates more sympathy for disaffected teens. Like many other young men around the world, Dagestan’s youth romanticized the war as a revolution; many supported their “brothers” fighting in the woods and mountains.
Shariat Jamaat, a Dagestani Islamic jihadist group, emerged over the past decade. Pledging allegiance to the worldwide Al Qaeda/salafist movements, Shariat Jamaat aims to establish a United Northern Caucasus "Emirate" front.
Salafism, women, and other gray areas
Recently, a young lady with a sahid belt and a name eliciting fears of terrorism was detained by Dagestani police. Perhaps this other Alla's life is bursting with coincidence- or maybe she was preparing to launch a copycat suicide bombing. Clearly, there is a rise in the cool factor of female suicide bombings that seems concentrated in the former Soviet states.
Observing the worrisome increase in black widow suicide bombings, journalist Anna Nemtsova observes:
Unlike the so-called black widows from Russia’s decade-long war with Chechnya, who were trained in camps before being sent to Moscow with their bombs, Dagestan’s female suicide bombers are not being trained in any special way, experts from leading human-rights groups, both international and Russian, say. Before blowing up the Moscow metro, the two Dagestani widows, with their faces covered, spoke in a video that circled the Internet in the days after their attack: “Sisters, if you really desire to help Allah, follow other girls who have sacrificed themselves,” one of them said.
The appeal to feminine sisterhood in the context of a market-driven modernity which brings strip clubs, pornography, and prostitution to public spaces can be powerful for women who feel that moral values have been sacrificed to moneyed interests. The Russian government's recent attempts to crack down on female converts to Islam raises questions of paternalism and disregard for civil liberties.
US-based terrorist Tamerlane Tsarnaev visited Dagestan for a period of six months during 2012 prior to his 2013 bombing of the Boston marathon with the help of his younger brother, Dzhohkar. For a few months, American journalists and media turned their eyes towards Dagestan, drawing new attention to the actions of the black widows.
Unfortunately, the media failed to elucidate the broader context in which Salafism's first attack was against local Muslims of the Sufi brotherhoods. The Salafist strategy vacillates in emphasis between targeted enemies. The jihad against Western culture generates endless media reports and analyses. Unfortunately, the jihad against fellow Muslims rarely enters the mainstream press. This is unfortunate because, ultimately, the greatest "enemies" of extremist Islam are the faithful Muslims now branded as "heretics" by jihadist groups.
SOURCES AND FURTHER READING
Alina Lobzina, "Russian authorities consider monitoring new Muslim converts", The Moscow News, 2 August 2012
Anna Nemtsova, "Russia's female menaces", The Daily Beast, 6 Sept. 2012
Anna Nemtsova, "Tighter crackdown in Dagestan fuels local miseries", Russia Beyond the Headlines, 31 July 2013
Charles J. Sullivan, "Dmitry's Dilemma: The Resurgence of Insurgent Activities in the North Caucusus", The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, January 2011
F. William Engdhal, "Salafism + CIA: A winning formula to destabilize Russia, the Middle East", Voltairenet, 13 September 2012
Gordon M. Hahn, "IIPER No. 60", CSIS, 31 August 2012
International Crisis Group, "Russia's Dagestan: Conflict Causes", Europe Report No. 192, 3 June 2008
Luke Harding, "Dagestan: My daughter, the terrorist", The Guardian, 18 June 2010
Marc Ginsberg, "A field guide to jihadi Dagestan and Chechnya", Huffington Post, 22 April 2013
Marina Dzhashi, "Radical Islam poses an enduring menace", RT, 27 April 2011
Mark Franchetti, "Dagestan: Bridal gown off, black widow's bomb belt on", The Sunday Times, 18 November 2012
Mark Galeotti, "Said Atsayev- Dagestan's Falcone?", In Moscow's Shadows, 29 August 2012
Natalia Antonova, "Fear rising in Muslim community", The Moscow News, 9 Sept. 2012
Ruslan Kurbanov, "Dagestani Muslims: From confrontation to peace", On Islam, 6 May 2012
Simon Saradzhyan, "Turncoats and converts make a deadly terrorist mix", Power & Policy, 11 September 2012
Steve Gutterman, "Caucuses suicide bomber named as Russian widow", Reuters, 29 August 2012
Tom Parfitt, "Russia's war in the Caucusus", Telegraph UK, 25 July 2012
"Ethnic Russian woman suspected as suicide bomber," The Moscow Times, 30 August 2012
"Islamists in Russia," The Economist, 27 April 2013
"Profile of suicide bomber Aminat Kurbanova", Russia-Eurasia Terror Watch, 30 August 2012
"Rizvan Kurbanov: Bandit underground does not submit to Doku Umarov", Georgia Times, 31 January 2012
"Suicide bomber kills Russian Sufi scholar", Al-Jazeera, 29 August 2012
"The evolution of Dagestani Salafism", Terrorism Watch, July 2013
"Widows of Chechnya purged by Russians", The Telegraph, 8 April 2004